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Abraham Lincoln, Praetor Maximus 
Examples abound in history, of leaders who have taken on dictatorial 
powers at the expense of constitutional order--Lucius Cornelius Sulla and 
Julius Caesar in classical Rome; Mao Zedong, Joseph Stalin, Hideki Tojo, 
Adolf Hitler, and Benito Mussolini in modern Europe and Asia. It would 
come as a shock to the sensibilities of most Americans who revere their 
sixteenth president that Abraham Lincoln is often placed in the company 
of such leaders. As we approach the bicentennial of Lincoln's birth, it is 
important to remember that throughout the Civil War he took actions that 
were viewed by many of his contemporaries--and are still viewed by 
many scholars--as beyond the limits of ordinary presidential authority, as 
perhaps dictatorial.
In 1861, after the South's attack on Fort Sumter, newly inaugurated 
President Lincoln opted for several counter-offensives that fell squarely 
within Article I of the United States Constitution, describing the national 
legislature's authority--not the president's. He blockaded Southern ports 
(effectively declaring a state of war); suspended habeas corpus between 
Washington D.C. and Philadelphia, and eventually across the North; 
expanded the regular army and navy; and ordered the U.S. Treasury to 
advance two million dollars to a private firm in New York for 
discretionary use on war supplies. Later he instituted military trials across 
North and South to dispense justice and ignored a Supreme Court 
directive challenging his authority to suspend the writ. Even the 
Emancipation Proclamation, Lincoln himself admitted, would have been 
beyond his authority in peacetime.
But 1861-65 was a time of rebellion--of Civil War--in the United States. 
How does this extraordinary circumstance change the legal implications 
of Lincoln's actions?
Enter Daniel Farber.
Farber's book, Lincoln's Constitution, could justifiably be re-titled 
"Lincoln's Constitutionality"(at the expense of the author's double 
entendre): it is more correctly characterized as an assessment of the 
legality of Lincoln's presidency than as an analysis of his interpretation 
(or reinterpretation) of the U.S. Constitution. In fact, this is one notable 
limit to Farber's legal history of the executive administration of the Civil 
War. He does not consider, as Garry Wills has, the significance of the 
Gettysburg Address in changing the Constitution by cleansing it of "that 
legal compromise" over the issue of slavery and by appealing instead to 
its "spirit," its moral root in the Declaration of Independence.[1] Except in 
passing, he does not consider, as David Herbert Donald has, Lincoln's 
Whig understanding of the Constitution that actually weakened the 
executive branch in relation to Congress and the cabinet, even if in war 
decisions it tended toward John Quincy Adams's expansive view that, "by 
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the laws of war an invaded country has all its laws and municipal 
institutions swept by the board, and martial law takes the place of them.... 
Whether the war be civil, servile, or foreign ... the military authority takes 
for the time the place of all municipal institutions, slavery among the 
rest."[2]
Farber's analysis of Lincoln's abidance by constitutional law, 
congressional statute, presidential precedent, and Supreme Court ruling is 
exhaustive. With the possible exception of J. G. Randall, no scholar to 
date has made as thorough a study of Lincoln's war measures in light of 
American law. More limited analyses have stopped at the (accurate) 
assertion that Lincoln himself never claimed his sweeping use of power 
was ordinarily legal. In essence, he went stovepipe hat in hand to a special 
session of Congress to ask ratification of his otherwise extralegal 
usurpation of congressional authority:
"These measures, whether strictly legal or not, were ventured upon, under 
what appeared to be a popular demand, and a public necessity; trusting, 
then as now, that Congress would readily ratify them. It is believed that 
nothing has been done beyond the constitutional competency of 
Congress."[3]
More limited analyses have pointed to Congress's August 1861 
ratification of Lincoln's actions, the Supreme Court's March 1863 Prize 
Cases decision upholding the legality of his early war measures, and 
Congress's 1863 Habeas Corpus Indemnity Act, which retroactively 
authorized all arrests and seizures made under authority of the president.
More limited analyses have gone back further to emphasize the 1787 
Constitutional Convention's decision to replace Congress's authority to 
"make" war with its authority to "declare" war, leaving it to the president 
to repel sudden attacks. Much more limited analyses have claimed broad, 
inherent, executive war powers--out of reach of the legislative and 
judicial branches--and other exclusively presidential prerogatives deduced 
from Article II clauses of the United States Constitution. These analyses 
have used the uncharacteristic claim of a preeminent constructionist, 
Thomas Jefferson, that jeopardizing the nation's "very high interests ... by 
scrupulous adherence to written law, would be to lose the law itself ... 
thus absurdly sacrificing the end to the means."[4] Or they have used 
Lincoln's refrain defending suspension of the writ, "are all the laws, but 
one, to go unexecuted, and the government itself go to pieces, lest that 
one be violated?"[5] Together, these arguments can be used to make a 
strong case for the constitutionality of Lincoln's war measures, and all are 
assessed by Farber--most of them in one chapter.
But it is important--especially as debates persist today over the balance 
between national security and individual rights, presidential and 
congressional authority, national and state sovereignty--to remember that 
Lincoln's presidency was extraordinary in our history. It is important, as 
we read presidential historian Michael Beschloss trumpeting the supreme 
value of presidential courage, to look closer at Lincoln's actions and 
understand where at crucial moments he probably overstepped his 
authority--even if he has been vindicated by history.[6] It is important, as 
Lincoln scholar Vernon Orville Burton pins the roots of an "imperial 
presidency" in the sixteenth president's "cavalier" approach to civil 
liberties, to recognize where the president was squarely within his legal 
bounds and where he showed great restraint.[7]
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For this, we can return to Daniel Farber's legal history of Lincoln's war 
decisions. Farber, the Sho Sato Professor of Law at the University of 
California, Berkeley, and McKnight Presidential Professor of Law at the 
University of Minnesota, has given us a disciplined and fair look at the 
sixteenth president's most controversial decisions. Farber considers a wide 
range of arguments both defending and condemning Lincoln: from his pre
-presidential conclusion that secession was indeed illegal--that the federal 
government had authority to coerce state governments into recognizing 
the supreme law of the land--to his exercise of powers ordinarily reserved 
by Congress, to his administration's infringements on individual liberties 
in North and South. The author is decisive where possible but allows 
uncertainty to remain where it must--particularly on constitutional 
questions of "original intent" that the framers themselves debated until 
their deaths.
Farber's conclusions, overall, are favorable to Lincoln's legacy. With the 
exception of some prominent freedom of speech infringements and cases 
of unjustified abridgement of individual rights in the North, most of what 
Lincoln did was strictly constitutional, falling within explicit presidential 
or congressional authority. It is a vital distinction, of course, that Lincoln's 
use of congressional powers--though probably necessary and in line with 
the "classic liberal view of emergency power"--were "approved and in all 
respects legalized and made valid" by Congress (p. 194). "Nowhere was 
there any thought," writes Farber, "that necessity alone gave the president 
an exemption from the legal consequences of violating statutory or 
constitutional requirements. Lincoln does not seem to have claimed such 
legal authority" (p. 195). Instead, Lincoln was retroactively granted 
executive and legislative prerogative to deal with the consequences of 
rebellion in the South.
Such being the case, Abraham Lincoln's accusers turn out to be right. In 
the classical Roman sense, he may accurately be called a dictator--a 
praetor maximus--vested temporarily with extraordinary power to deal 
with crisis. It is lucky, Farber reminds us, that at the crucial moment a 
man of "unshakable determination, combined with a shrewd sense of 
reality" was available to lead (p. 199).
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